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Sarah Fuller
Introduction
Despite the fact that foreign aid has been around in its
present form since World War II, foreign aid analysis, especially
from the donor's point of view, has been and continues to be high-
ly contested.  In 1992, the United Nations claimed that "ODA
[Official Development Assistance] allocation is 'strange and arbi-
trary'" and "ODA is determined not by the needs of developing
countries, but by the fluctuating goodwill of the people and their
parliaments in the rich countries.  As a result, it is largely ad hoc
and unpredictable" (United Nations Development Programme,
45).  This statement cannot, however, explain why Africa is con-
sistently the world's most aided region (Lancaster, 487).
Something about African countries continually appeals to the
donor countries, meaning that ODA allocation is not as strange
and arbitrary as the UN claimed.  This begs the question: What
motivates donor countries to give aid to countries in Africa?  
Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor
address this question in "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A
Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid
Flows," in which they provide a systematic explanation of donor
motivations.  In their research they examine why America, Japan,
France, and Sweden gave foreign aid to 36 countries in Africa
from 1980 to 1989.  The present study addresses the same ques-
tion from 1990 to 1999 and draws largely on Schraeder et al.'s
work.  However, the end of the Cold War was a turning point for
donor motivations.  Traditional military issues, such as contain-
ment and military alliances with recipients with greater military
abilities, began to decline in importance.  Issues that had previ-
ously been overlooked, such as regional stability, became increas-
ingly important, and countries with the ability to affect that stabil-
ity became important strategically for donors looking to prevent
the need for military intervention.  Meanwhile, economic issues
also became increasingly important.  Thus, this study largely
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replicates Schraeder et al.'s research, but it also goes beyond
Schraeder et al.'s work to examine the changes brought about by
the end of the Cold War.  
The first section of this research provides a review of the
theoretical and empirical literature that researchers use to explain
donor motivations.  Particular attention is paid to the competing
theories in the field.  The second section sets forth the research
design and variable operationalization of the present study.
Finally, the third section contains the analysis, findings, and con-
clusions of the research.
Literature Review
There are three general theories of donor motivations that
researchers acknowledge as possible explanations for their find-
ings.  They are the idealist, realist, and neo-realist explanations,
and they are all widely supported by empirical research.  These
theories provide not only explanations for why governments
choose certain recipient countries, but they are also justifications
that governments use to earn their citizens' support for their policy
choices. 
Idealist Theory
The idealist theory posits that governments use aid to pro-
mote humanitarian concerns.  Idealist scholars are optimistic
about foreign aid's ability to solve the problems of Third World
poverty and underdevelopment.  Thus, this theory also asserts that
donors may give foreign aid to support the spread of democracy
and human rights.  In short, idealists believe foreign aid is based
on humanitarian need.  Many researchers in the field have come
to similar conclusions that countries with lower income on a per
capita basis receive more aid than middle-income countries
(Dowling and Hiemenz, 540).  A conclusion from a textbook on
economics states that donors use their foreign aid in ways that
favor the poorest countries over the middle-income countries
(Gillis et al., 378).  These findings strongly suggest that donor
countries give foreign aid based on humanitarian need.
Realist Theory
The realist theory contrasts sharply with the idealist theory
and was widely accepted toward the end of the Cold War.
Realists believe that foreign aid policies are made with strategic
concerns in mind, such as national security and self-preservation
(Schraeder et al., 296).  Thus, "foreign aid is perceived as only
minimally related to recipient economic development and the
humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed" (Ibid).
Realist scholars expect countries with the most humanitarian need
to be passed over by the donor countries if the recipient countries
cannot also provide significant alliances and military aid.
Schraeder et al. cite R.D. McKinlay and their own Steven Hook
as the founders of research supporting the realist theory.  In his
research, McKinlay concludes that the humanitarian theory,
though providing a simple moral relationship between donors and
aid, is flawed (McKinlay, 447). His research shows that France
and America, more than any other countries, base their donations
on national interest.  He finds, for example, that America’s role as
a global superpower concerned about security is reflected in its
aid donations (Ibid, 451).  Steven Hook also argues that foreign
aid is given purely out of national interest.  In his book, National
Interests and Foreign Aid, he states "the fundamental principle of
aid giving as 'the price of affluence' has been accepted by nearly
all industrialized states, which have added the fiscal aid institu-
tional components of foreign aid to their diplomatic arsenal"
(Hook, 21).  He begins his book with a quote by E.H. Carr that
sums up Hook's findings and beliefs: "the accepted standard of
international morality in regard to the altruistic virtues appears to
be that a state should indulge in them so far as this is not serious-
ly incompatible with its more important interests" (Ibid, 3).  Thus,
scholars in this vein would argue that aid is given only when it
agrees with national interests.
Neo-realist Theory
The neo-realist theory is the third general theory that is
widely accepted by researchers in the field.  It is an evolved (post-
Cold War) form of the realist explanation.  National interests still
form the basis of foreign aid, but the focus shifts from national
security and self-preservation to economic interests.  Neo-realists
argue that donor countries use aid in ways that promote their eco-
nomic interests (Tuman et al., 89).  Thus, donors will give more
aid to the countries that have the most to offer them by way of
exports, access to raw materials, and industrial competitiveness.
In short, donor countries give foreign aid to "create export and
investment opportunities, particularly in larger countries that offer
large markets to [the donor country's] firms" (Ibid).  In their
research, scholars challenge the idealist theory, claiming that
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"many donor governments have indicated that, in their aid alloca-
tions, they also take their own national interests into account
[such as] maintaining spheres of influence, […] or simply of pro-
moting their own export trade" (Maizels and Nissanke: 879).
Schraeder et al. found that economic interests dominated Japan's
motivation, with the top recipients providing essential raw materi-
als for Japanese industry, serving as a potential source of such raw
materials, or providing major markets for Japanese products
(Schraeder et al., 312).  Thus, many scholars would argue that
national interests, especially economic interests, are the determin-
ing factor for deciding who will get the foreign aid.
Combining the Three Theories
Recent research supports the conclusion that donors do not
give aid for only one reason.  Instead, they prioritize their dona-
tions so that they may give aid in ways that support all three theo-
ries, but with different degrees of importance.  Research by
Schraeder et al. shows that in the 1980s the United States was pri-
marily concerned with military possibilities, secondly with eco-
nomic potential, next with anti-Communist countries, and lastly
with helping countries plagued with lower economic growth rates
than the rest of the African countries.  These findings support all
three theories.  France was found to give the most weight to
spreading its own culture, thereby giving more aid to former
colonies, and secondly to countries with greater strategic impor-
tance to France, thus supporting primarily the neo-realist theory
and to a lesser extent the realist theory.  Sweden's helping former
Portuguese colonies first, then countries with a socialist ideology,
and lastly countries with higher Gross National Product (GNP)
per capita means it also supports a mixture of the theories.  The
first two motivations are strategic in nature and have to do with
Sweden's attempt to maintain its sphere of influence during the
Cold War.  The third motivation is economic, as a higher GNP per
capita means a larger market.  Other researchers have found that
although "Japan did target economic assistance to countries with
lower per capita income," their economic national interests played
a much greater role, as "ODA was used to promote Japan's nation-
al economic interests," showing the dual motivations of neo-real-
ist and idealist motivations (Tuman et al., 98).  Therefore, there is
the possibility that aid motivations may be a mixture of the ideal-
ist, realist, and/or neo-realist theories.
The end of the Cold War made it possible for donor coun-
tries to diversify their reasons for giving aid.  Ideological stance
was a key factor for determining the recipients of foreign aid dur-
ing the Cold War because the United States in particular would
not support Marxist or socialist regimes, while Sweden supported
socialist countries.  However, a region-wide recession and the rise
of pro-democracy movements caused leaders of all ideologies to
reassess their political and economic ideologies.  The fall of
Communism and the end of the Cold War played no small role in
accelerating the wave of change to capitalism.  Increasing
International Monetary Fund requirements of restructuring
economies and political systems according to free-market princi-
ples also spurred the change.  By 1993, all previously Marxist
countries had converted to capitalism, and Libya was the only
country in Africa that was officially committed to a version of
socialism.  Thus, donors were no longer limited to helping some
countries and not others based on their ideologies in the 1990s.
Donors did not need to maintain their military alliances
created for the purposes of containment after the Cold War.
Countries with large militaries went from being favored with aid
due to their ability to aid in containing Communism to being per-
ceived as something of a threat to regional peace and stability in
the aftermath of the Cold War.  Thus, what qualifies as a strategic
military benefit to the donors begins to change after the Cold War.
Countries with smaller militaries become preferable for donors
because they have less potential to threaten peace and stability
within their regions through civil or external wars.
Thus, by no longer needing to buy allies as they did during
Cold War, donor countries are more free than ever before in the
history of foreign aid to give aid for a multitude of reasons.
Therefore the importance of humanitarian and economic causes
increases in the 1990s and donors are able to mix and match their
aid policies to pursue many different ends.  Thus, in the aftermath
of the Cold War, it is unexpected that any donor country would
give aid purely for one reason, humanitarian, military, or econom-
ic, alone.1
1There is a fourth theory in the field: the neo-Marxist paradigm.  Neo-Marxists
share the neo-realist's belief in the donor country's goal of profiting from giving
foreign aid.  However, neo-Marxists see donor countries as actively seeking to keep
recipient countries from moving up in the world while profiting from the relation-
ship and increasing economic disparity in recipient countries.  Neo-realists believe
that donor countries have at least some interest in the prosperity of the recipient
country because of the markets it provides.  Such a theory is intrinsically difficult
to test, and therefore lacks empirical research to support it.  Therefore, though this
theory is a compelling explanation, indeed, one that has held considerable sway
with scholars for decades, it must be excluded from this research.  For an intriguing
though non-empirical first-hand account in support of the neo-Marxist paradigm,
see Nanda Shrestha, "Becoming a Development Category," Power of Development
(Jonathan Crush, Ed), (New York: Rutledge, 1995).
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Research Design
This study hopes to reach new conclusions regarding
donor motivation by comparing the results of this study to the
results of Schraeder et al.’s research.  At a time when the pool of
foreign aid donors was shrinking and most governments were
making cuts in foreign aid contributions, it can be expected that
donors gave higher priority to countries that satisfied their qualifi-
cations, making the decade immediately after the end of the Cold
War an ideal time period to study in order to determine donor
motivations.  This study hopes to confirm that the end of the Cold
war coincided with a decrease in the motivational power of strate-
gic military interest as expressed through the importance of the
recipient's military capabilities and an increase in the importance
of countries having smaller militaries.  This study also hopes to
show the expected increase in the motivational powers of humani-
tarian causes and economic benefits that correspond with the end
of the Cold War and greater freedom to pursue more ends through
foreign aid. 
The donor countries of this study are the United States,
France, Sweden, and Japan.  They are all known for their major
contributions in Africa, relative to other donors.  As northern 
industrialized democracies all four donors also share similar char-
acteristics.  However, they play significantly different roles inter-
national politics, and as such, have varying motivations for giving
aid.  The recipient countries remain the same 36 African
countries2 that Schraeder et al. use in their research, with it being
noted that Zaire became the Democratic Republic of Congo.  In a
departure from Schraeder et al.'s research, this research adds
South Africa to the study because beginning in 1994 with the end
of Apartheid the four donors began contributing foreign aid to
South Africa for various reasons.  South Africa is a valuable case
due to its struggle for democracy, having enormous humanitarian
need due to the AIDS epidemic, and its prospects as a trade part-
ner.  The reasoning behind the selection of these 37 cases is that it
provides a large number of cases with considerable diversity
while avoiding complications that might arise from subsystem dif-
ferences that could come up when comparing countries in Africa
with countries in other regions of the world.  Thus, the research
2Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Egypt, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
design is a pooled cross-sectional time-series with the unit of
analysis at the national level.  There are a total of 370 cases.
The dependent variable throughout the research is the
amount of foreign aid given to the 37 countries in Africa by each
of the four donor countries.  The dependent variable is opera-
tionalized as the yearly amount of foreign aid given to the 37
African recipients by each of the donor countries between 1990
and 1999, which is shown in Appendix A, and is expressed as a
percentage of the recipient country's GNP in US dollars.3 In
order to determine what motivates the four donor countries, this
research examines three hypotheses, which test the idealist, real-
ist, and neo-realist theories explained in the literature review.
Hypothesis 1: Donor countries will increase the amount of for-
eign aid they give recipient countries as the humanitarian need in
the recipient countries increases.
If the research supports this hypothesis, then it will sup-
port the idealist explanation of donor countries' motivations.
Thus, countries with the greatest humanitarian need will be given
the most aid.  Humanitarian need has four measures.  The first
measure is the average life expectancy of the recipient country's
population.4 The second measure is that population's daily caloric
intake.5 The third measure is the GNP per capita in the recipient
country.6 This measure is tricky because it requires a negative
3 Source of data is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
online database: "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients
1969-2000," www.sourceoecd.org.  The measure of ODA used is Total Gross ODA.
It is not divided into loans and grants, but it is only financial contributions, so aid
such as Food for Peace is not included.  Also, for Liberia, Libya, and Somalia,
GNP measures were unavailable, so GDP measures were substituted.  The correla-
tion between GDP and GNP for countries that had both measures available had a
Pearson’s R of .995 with a T significance of .000, meaning that the two measures
can be substituted without biasing the results.  Source for GDP data is Statistical
Yearbook, (New York: United Nations, 2000).
4 Source is the World Development Indicators, CD-ROM, (Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank, 2001).
5 Source is the Human Development Reports, (New York: United Nations
Development Program (UNDP, 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2000).
6Source is "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1969-
2000."  GNP per capita data is unavailable for Liberia, Libya, and Somalia, so GDP
per capita is substituted.  A correlation between GNP per capita and GDP per capita
has a Pearson’s R of .982 and a T significance of .000, meaning that the two can be
substituted without biasing the results.  Source of GDP per capita is Statistical
Yearbook, (New York: United Nations, 2000).
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relationship in the analysis to support this hypothesis, as a lower
GNP per capita shows greater humanitarian need.  The final meas-
ure is a deviation from Schraeder et al.'s work.  It is a dummy
variable that measures whether or not the recipient country has
suffered some kind of internal war, civil or ethnic based, for two
or more years out of the ten-year period.7 Due to the donor coun-
tries' commitment to aiding countries suffering from such strife
and the large number of recipient countries in Africa suffering
from this problem during the period in question, it is an appropri-
ate measure for this research. 
Figure 1 shows that the donor countries must favor the
three countries with the lowest average caloric intakes, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, and Burundi, for this measure to support the
hypothesis.  Figure 2 shows that the donor countries must support
the four countries with the lowest average life expectancies, Sierra
Leon, Rwanda, Malawi, and Uganda, to support the hypothesis.
Figure 3 shows that the three countries with the lowest GNP per
capita, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, must be favored for this measure to support the humani-
tarian hypothesis.  Figure 4 shows which countries suffered from
internal war for at least two of the years in question.
Figure 1
7Source of data is The World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact-
book/, CIA, 2001.
Figure 2
Figure 3
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Figure 4
The charts immediately below show the distributions of the data
over the ten-year period for all 37 recipient countries.8
Daily Caloric Intake (in calories)
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
2298.2 2159.00 1610 3336
Average Life Expectancy (in years)
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
52.04 50 34 72
GNP Per Capita (in U.S. dollars)
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
903.44 352 120 6484.25
8 Note that for all distribution charts the mode is not included because there are
actually multiple modes.
Hypothesis 2: Donor countries give more foreign aid to countries
with strategic importance.
This hypothesis tests the realists' "national interests" argu-
ment.  Due to the end of the Cold War, strategic importance as a
motivating factor for giving aid should decrease from 1990 to
1999.  However, events in the Middle East during most of the
period in question, but especially during the early 1990s, may
cause traditional strategic importance to continue to be a motivat-
ing factor.  Also, the increasing importance of regional stability as
an important aspect of strategic importance may mean that strate-
gic importance has merely changed in definition, not in its
strength as a motivating factor since the end of the Cold War.
Strategic importance is measured in two ways.  The first is the
percentage of the recipient country's GNP that is spent on the mil-
itary.  The second measure of strategic importance is the percent-
age of the country's labor force that is employed by the military.9
Both of these measures were used in the Schraeder et al.'s
research.10
Figure 5 shows that the donor countries must favor Sudan,
Angola, and Rwanda for their high percentage of GNP spent on
the military.  However, this illustrates a problem with the data.  It
should be noted that Angola and Rwanda both suffered from
internal wars during the period in question.  Thus, their high rank-
ing in regard to this measure is misleading.  They would probably
not be pursued by the donor countries due to their military poten-
tial, but they may receive aid from donors hoping to promote
peace and stability in the region to avoid the need for military
intervention.  The misleading nature of this data should be kept in
mind during the analysis later in this study.  Figure 6 shows that
the donor countries must favor Libya, Angola (again), and Egypt
for their high percentage of the labor force that is employed by
the military if they are to be seen as donors positively motivated
by strategic importance.  This measure is also misleading.
9 Source for the second and third measures of strategic importance is the World
Development Indicators.
10 Schraeder et al. used a third measure, the maintenance of a military alliance
between the donor and recipient country, to measure the strategic importance vari-
able, which, due to a lack of data, I cannot include in this research.
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Figure 5
Figure 6
The charts below show the distribution of the data for the two
measures of strategic importance.
Percentage of the GNP Spent on the Military
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
12.76% 9.90% 1% 65%
Percentage of the Labor Force Employed by the Military
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
.83% .43% 0% 7%
Hypothesis 3: Donor countries will give more aid to countries
with higher economic potential.
Recall that neo-realists argue that economic potential is
what motivates donors to give foreign aid.  Schraeder et al.
expected the importance of economic potential to increase in the
post-Cold War era.  This change in priority is due to the fact that
after the fall of Communism, many donor countries began to real-
ize that they no longer needed to buy allegiance with their foreign
aid and began to cut back on their contributions.  As a result, the
competition among recipient countries increased as they vied for
the remainder of the foreign aid offerings.  One way to lure donor
countries, according to neo-realists, is to provide economic incen-
tives.  Thus, one would expect to see an increase in economic
national interest as a motivator throughout the 1990s. 
This research uses three measures of economic potential.
The first measure is the importance of trade with the donor coun-
try, as measured by the percentage of total imports that the recipi-
ent imports from the donor country.11 The second measure is the
recipient country's GNP per capita, because a larger GNP per
capita means larger markets.12 Note that this is the same measure
as is used to test the humanitarian hypothesis.  A positive correla-
tion in the models with GNP per capita means that this measure
11 Source of data is the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, 1992 and 2000).
12 Source of data is "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid
Recipients 1969-2000."  GNP per capita data is unavailable for Liberia, Libya, and
Somalia, so GDP per capita is substituted.  A correlation between GNP per capita
and GDP per capita has a Pearson’s R of .982 and a T significance of .000, mean-
ing that the two can be substituted without biasing the results.  Source of GDP per
capita data is Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 2000).
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supports the economic potential hypothesis.  The third measure is
a departure from Schraeder et al.'s research.  It is a dummy vari-
able for whether or not oil is one of the main exports of the recip-
ient country during the period in question.13 Because the four
donors in this study are all largely dependent on foreign sources
of oil, their connections with oil exporters are very important to
their economies.  Thus, the potential for the donors' access to oil
is an excellent measure of economic potential in Africa.
Figure 7 shows that based on percentage of trade, the US
should favor Egypt with ODA, France should favor Gabon,
Sweden should favor Ethiopia, and Japan should favor Liberia if
they are to be considered as motivated by economic potential.
Figure 8 shows that based on GNP per capita, the four donors
should favor Libya, Gabon, and South Africa to qualify as donors
based on economic potential.  Figure 9 shows which recipient
countries are oil exporters.
13 Source of data is The World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact-
book/, CIA, 2001.
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
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The analysis program used for getting the distribution of the data
for the imports from each donor country, as a percentage of total
imports, was unable to compute any of the distributions.
However, the data distribution of GNP per capita is given below.
GNP Per Capita (in U.S. dollars)
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
903.44 352 120 6484.25
Hypotheses not Dealt with in this Study
It should be noted that Schraeder et al. tested three addi-
tional hypotheses that are not examined in this research.  Regional
specialists claim that it is important to look at both the regions of
Africa and the colonial ties, or cultural similarity, between the
donor and recipient countries.  They argue that donor countries
may have a common policy for all countries within a region.
They also cite France's strong preference for helping its former
colonies and Sweden's preference for helping former Portuguese
colonies as the importance for testing for cultural similarity.
However, the dummy variable measures for these two
hypotheses substantially overlapped and had coincidental compli-
cations that confused the models during analysis.  For example,
all of the former Belgian colonies included in this study, Burundi,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda all suffered from
ethnic/civil wars during the period in question.  A relationship
favoring the former Belgian colonies appears to support the cul-
tural similarity hypothesis, when in fact the data is actually show-
ing that donors are motivated by recipients that are suffering from
internal strife.  The additional humanitarian measure of the war
dummy variable in this research accounts for this possibility.  The
way Schraeder et al. divide up the regions also biases the find-
ings, since some regions contain only a few countries while others
have as many as 14.
Other problems with the region and colony measures
included substantial overlap with the former Portuguese colonies
all being in the South region, and certain regions being predomi-
nantly former French colonies.  This high degree of multi-
collinearity between the two measures leads to inaccurate findings
with regression models.  In addition, with the end of the Cold
War, it is logical that donors could now place more importance on
their economic and humanitarian desires than on propping up
countries that were similar for the sake of maintaining alliances.
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Therefore, the hypotheses of region and cultural similarity are not
included in this research.
The third hypothesis not included in this research but
examined by Schraeder et al. dealt with ideology.  As explained
earlier, ideology becomes insignificant in the aftermath of the
Cold War.  By 1993, Libya is the only country in question that is
not committed to capitalism.  Thus, ideological stance cannot
yield any significant correlations in this study because there is lit-
tle variation among the market orientation of recipient countries.
Therefore, one of Schraeder et al.'s most important variables for
their research must be dropped from this research.
Analysis, Findings, and Conclusion
Analysis of the data determines what motivated donor
countries to give aid to recipient countries from 1990 to 1999.  A
normal Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model run
through STATA for each of the four donors provides the bulk of
the analysis.  However, research by Beck and Katz shows that in
research where there is a large number of cases relative to the
time period in question, as is the case in this research, normal
OLS models may greatly exaggerate the confidence of the find-
ings.  As a check on the normal OLS regression models, the four
models were run through STATA a second time to get Panel-
Corrected OLS regression models, as recommended by Beck and
Katz, which nullify any of the inaccuracies of the normal OLS
regressions.  However, the Panel-Corrected OLS models in
STATA cannot give such measures as Standardized Beta
Coefficients, which allow one to compare the relative weights of
explanatory factors, and also Adjusted R Squares, which indicate
the overall explanatory power of the models.  Therefore, the
Panel-Corrected models serve only as a validity check on the sub-
stantive and statistical significance findings of the normal OLS
regressions and not as the basis of the analysis.  Basic results of
the normal OLS models and the Panel-Corrected OLS models are
presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.14 The full regres-
sion statistics are given in Appendix B for the normal OLS mod-
els and Appendix C for the Panel-Corrected OLS models.
14Two measures are dropped from the regression models due to multicollinearity
complications that distort the findings if they are included in the models.  The first
is average life expectancy, which has a Pearsons's R statistic of .816 and a t signifi-
cance of .000 with daily caloric intake, and a Pearson's R statistic of .563 and a t
significance of .000 with GNP per capita.  These relationships are logically to be
expected.  The other measure not included is the percentage of the labor force that
is employed by the military.  It has a Pearson's R statistic of .692 with GNP per
capita, and .407 with average life expectancy, both significant at the .000 level.
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The United States
The United States has a fairly weak but significant regres-
sion model in terms of its Adjusted R Square of .1351 with an F
significance of .0006.  Nevertheless, the model shows that the
U.S. supports all three hypotheses and theories.  The U.S. is most
strongly motivated by helping countries that suffer from internal
strife, as the war dummy variable has a standardized beta of .235
and a t significance of .023.  This finding supports the U.S.'s com-
mitment to helping countries suffering from brutal civil/ethnic
wars and, to some extent, helping countries struggling to establish
or maintain democracy.  It thus supports the humanitarian hypoth-
esis, and therefore the idealist theory of donor motivations, which
holds that donors give aid for humanitarian reasons.
Second in explanatory strength for the U.S. is the measure
of trade, which has a standardized beta of .230 and a t signifi-
cance of .023.  This means that the U.S. prefers to help countries
with which it has more trade.  This finding can be explained by
the U.S.'s policy of giving aid to assist in the development of the
private sector in recipient countries while promoting U.S. private
investment in the recipient countries.  This finding supports the
economic potential hypothesis, and thereby supports the neo-real-
ist theory that claims donors give aid for economic benefits.
The percentage of recipient's the GNP that is spent on the
military is the third most powerful explanatory measure.  It has a
standardized beta of -.217 and a t significance of .016.  The nega-
tive relationship, coupled with the knowledge that the U.S. gives
the most priority to helping countries struggling with internal
strife, indicates that the U.S. is no longer motivated by military
potential – at least not in the traditional sense of seeking out
recipients with stronger military abilities.  As previously dis-
cussed, the countries with the highest military expenditures are
also mostly countries suffering from internal wars.  However, the
analysis shows that the U.S. helps these countries out first.
Therefore, the U.S. has to be favoring other countries with much
smaller militaries to create the negative relationship.  This can be
can be explained in two ways.  First, the U.S. no longer needs to
maintain its Cold War alliances, and therefore does not need to
help countries with larger militaries.  In this sense, the analysis
shows that the expected decline in the motivating power of mili-
tary potential in the aftermath of the Cold War is occurring.
However, with the end of the Cold War, issues that were previous-
ly ignored, such as regional instability, become more prominent.
In this respect, the U.S. tries to promote peace and stability within
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Africa by giving aid to countries with smaller militaries.  By pro-
moting peace through aid, the U.S. can hopefully avoid the need
for costly military interventions, such as in Somalia, and achieve
its stated goal of promoting regional cooperation among develop-
ing countries.  Thus, the definition for what qualifies as a strategic
military benefit has changed since the end of the Cold War.
Therefore, this finding at the same time shows the expected
decline of military potential in the traditional sense as a motivator,
where donors seek recipients for their military abilities, yet sup-
ports the military potential hypothesis, due to the change in what
is defined as a strategic military benefit in the aftermath of the
Cold War.  Hence, it also supports the realist theory that donors
give aid based on the recipient country's strategic importance to
the donor.
The final and weakest motivator for the U.S. is the meas-
ure of GNP per capita.  The standardized beta of -.190 with a t
significance of .047 indicates that the measure supports the
humanitarian interpretation rather than the economic interpreta-
tion, which would have required a positive relationship.  The
U.S.'s commitment to poverty reduction in recipient countries
explains this finding.  It therefore supports the humanitarian
hypothesis, and therefore the idealist theory of donor motivations.
Thus, the model shows that the U.S. has gone from being
equally motivated by both strategic importance and economic
potential and thirdly by humanitarian need in Schraeder et al.'s
research to being motivated dominantly by humanitarian need,
secondly by economic potential, and lastly by military potential in
the 1990s.  This supports the overall decline of strategic military
concerns and the increase of humanitarian and economic interests
expected after the end of the Cold War.
France
France has a very strong model with an Adjusted R Square
of .5164 and an F significance of .0000.  France, like the U.S.,
also supports a mixture of the three donor motivation theories.
By far the most important explanatory factor for France is trade
with the recipient country.  The measure has a standardized beta
of .708 and a t significance of .000.  This shows that France
strongly favors countries with higher economic potential as
expressed by trade opportunity.  France's commitment to promot-
ing sustainable development through economic development helps
explain this finding.  It supports the economic potential hypothe-
sis, and therefore the neo-realist theory of donor motivations,
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which holds that donors give aid for their own economic benefit.
Daily caloric intake and GNP per capita are the second
and third strongest explanatory measure for France.  With a stan-
dardized beta of -.266 and -.213 respectively, and both having a t
significance of .004 or better, the negative relationships support
the humanitarian expectation that France gives more aid to coun-
tries with greater humanitarian need.  France favors countries
where the people have less to eat and less income, indicating
greater humanitarian need, supporting France's claim that it pur-
sues sustainable development in recipient countries through
poverty reduction.  These findings therefore support the humani-
tarian need hypothesis, and hence support the idealist theory,
which holds that donors give aid for humanitarian reasons.
The percentage of the GNP the recipient country spends
on its military is the final and least explanatory measure of
France's motivations for giving aid.  With a standardized beta of 
-.146 and a t significance of .025, the finding shows that France,
like the U.S., favors countries with smaller militaries.  As
explained in the U.S.'s analysis, this supports both the expected
decline in the importance of traditional military potential as a
motivating factor, yet also supports the change in what constitutes
military potential after the end of the Cold War and therefore sup-
ports the military potential hypothesis.  The finding hence also
supports the realist theory, which states that donors give aid for
countries that are strategically important to the donor country.
France's model therefore shows that during the 1990s,
trade dominates France's motivations, with humanitarian need
coming in a distant second, and military potential taking third
place.  Thus, France's motivations have changed from Schraeder
et al.'s research, which found that France preferred to give aid
firstly to former colonies for the spread of its culture, which this
research does not test, and secondly to countries with military
potential.  These findings support the post-Cold War expectation
that economic and humanitarian interests would increase in moti-
vational power while strategic military interests would decline.
Sweden
Sweden's regression model has a weak Adjusted R Square
of .1778 and an F significance of .0000.  Nevertheless, the model
supports the idea that Sweden might still be considered the dar-
ling of the Third World.  Three explanatory measures are signifi-
cant.  Of those three, daily caloric intake and the war dummy
variable are the first and third strongest measures, with standard-
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ized betas of -.409 and .217 respectively.  Daily caloric intake has
a t significance of .000 and the war dummy variable has a t signif-
icance of .017.  Both of these findings support Sweden's role as
darling of the Third World because they show that Sweden has a
strong preference for helping countries suffering from greater
famine and internal wars, both of which constitute greater human-
itarian need.  These findings support Sweden's claim that it uses
aid to promote sustainable, positive development for the poor, to
foster common security, and to help countries suffering from
internal wars.  Thus, these findings support the humanitarian need
hypothesis, and therefore the idealist theory, which holds that
donors give aid for humanitarian reasons.
Trade is the second strongest measure of Sweden's motiva-
tions, so Sweden is not whole-heartedly devote to the humanitari-
an cause.  The measure of trade has a standardized beta of .286
and a t significance of .001.  This finding shows that Sweden
gives preferential treatment to countries with which it has more
economic opportunities through trade.  Trade is one way that
Sweden pursues its commitment to fostering income equality in
recipient countries, but it cannot be doubted that Sweden also gets
economic benefits from the relationships.  This finding supports
the economic potential hypothesis, and thus the neo-realist theory
that donors give aid for economic benefits.
Therefore, Sweden has changed since the period Schraeder
et al. examined, when Sweden was motivated primarily by help-
ing former Portuguese colonies, which is not tested in this
research, secondly by countries with a socialist ideology, also not
tested because of its irrelevance to the recipient countries in the
1990s, and lastly by countries with higher GNPs per capita.  In
the decade after the Cold War, Sweden's motivations changed to
helping predominantly countries with greater humanitarian need,
due to suffering from famine and internal strife, and secondly by
economic benefits from trade partners.  These findings support the
expected post-Cold War increase in the motivational power of
humanitarian and economic interests.
Japan
Japan's regression model also supports a mixture of the
donor motivation theories.  With an Adjusted R Square of .3264
and an F significance of .0000, the model as a whole is moderate-
ly strong.  The strongest measure is daily caloric intake, with a
standardized beta of -.315 and a t significance of .001.  The nega-
tive relationship shows that Japan favors helping countries with
Res Publica 98
greater humanitarian need as expressed by greater famine.  This
finding supports the humanitarian need hypothesis, and thereby
the idealist theory of donor motivations, that donors give aid for
humanitarian reasons.
The percentage of the recipient's GNP that is spent on the
military is the second strongest measure of Japan's motivation.  It
has a standardized beta of -.254 and a t significance of .001.  As
explained in both France and the U.S.'s analysis, the negative
relationship both supports the expected decline in support for mil-
itary potential as expressed by the recipient country's military
ability, and the change in definition of what constitutes strategic
military importance because Japan may use aid to try to promote
peace and stability and avoid the need for military intervention.
This finding supports the military potential hypothesis, and there-
by the realist theory of donor motivations, which states that
donors prefer to aid countries that have greater strategic impor-
tance to them.
The oil dummy variable has the third strongest explanato-
ry power with a standardized beta of -.225 and a t significance of
.002.  The negative relationship indicates that Japan does not
specifically seek to help the oil exporters in Africa.  This can be
explained due to the fact that Japan does not rely upon the African
oil exporters for the bulk of its oil, so it does not need to show
them any favoritism.  Meanwhile, the countries that do not export
oil are largely those countries with the greatest humanitarian need,
such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Burundi, which have the low-
est daily caloric intake of the 37 countries.  Sierra Leon, Rwanda,
Malawi, and Uganda, which have the lowest life expectancies, are
not oil exporters.  And the two countries with the highest military
expenditures, which the analysis shows Japan has a negative rela-
tionship with, Sudan and Angola, are oil exporters.  Given Japan's
preferences for aid recipients with greater humanitarian need and
smaller militaries and Japan's lack of need for favoring Africa's oil
exporters, it is not surprising that Japan has a negative relation-
ship with the oil exporters.  This finding does not support the eco-
nomic potential hypothesis, and therefore does not support the
neo-realist theory of donor motivations, that donors give aid for
economic benefits.
The measure with the least explanatory power for Japan
further supports the finding that Japan gives aid for humanitarian
reasons.  GNP per capita in Japan's model has a standardized beta
of -.210 and a t significance of .014.  The negative relationship
shows that Japan favors countries with lower GNPs per capita,
and thus greater humanitarian need.  This finding supports the
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humanitarian need hypothesis.  Therefore, the finding also sup-
ports the idealist theory of donor motivation, stating that donors
give aid for humanitarian reasons.
Japan's model shows that its motivations have changed in
their priorities since Schraeder et al.'s research.  In the 1980s, eco-
nomic potential dominated Japan's motivations.  In the post-Cold
War era, economic potential is no longer even a motivator.
Rather, the model shows that Japan is at a stage in its history
where it helps countries predominantly for humanitarian reasons
and secondly for strategic military reasons.  This can be explained
by Japan's shifting its aid policies away from granting aid purely
for economic reasons to more humanitarian reasons in Africa dur-
ing the 1990s.  Given the change from military strategic impor-
tance being recipients with large military abilities to recipients
that can be stabilized and pacified through aid to avoid conflicts,
the findings also confirm the expectation that traditional strategic
importance would decline and humanitarian interests would
increase in the decade after the end of the Cold War.
Double Checking with Panel-Corrected OLS Regression Models
The purpose of the Panel-Corrected regression models is
to serve as a validity check on the normal OLS models' substan-
tive and statistical findings.  The most important finding when
comparing the Panel-Corrected OLS models and the normal OLS
models is that the signs of the coefficients between the two ver-
sions all remain the same.  This means that the direction of the
relationships discussed previously are sound.
The Panel-Corrected models confirm almost all of the
relationships found in the normal models.  Only the statistical sig-
nificance of two out of the 15 measures that were significant in
the normal OLS models become insignificant when tested by the
Panel-Corrected models.  One is the U.S.'s measure of trade,
which falls from a significance of .023 in the normal OLS model
to .082 in the Panel-Corrected version.  The second measure is
Sweden's war dummy variable, which falls from a significance of
.017 to .150.  Conclusions drawn from these two measures should
be questioned, but a goal of future research should be to confirm
these doubts.  Conclusions based on the other 13 measures can be
held with certainty.
Res Publica 100
Conclusion
This study has tested and confirmed that the United States
between 1990 and 1999 is motivated primarily by humanitarian
need and secondly by strategic military importance.  Economic
potential dominates France's motivations, followed by humanitari-
an need and strategic military importance, respectively.  Sweden
can still argue that it is the darling of the Third World based on its
being primarily motivated by humanitarian need, but its secondary
preference for countries with which it has more trade deflates the
title a bit.  Humanitarian need is Japan's primary motivation, and
strategic military importance is second.
Each of these four cases support a mixture of two or all
three of the theories of donor motivations, showing that the selec-
tion of aid recipients is very complex and not without the expecta-
tion of getting some kind of benefit, be it economic, military, or
both, in return.  The findings support the decline in the traditional
sense of strategic military importance, as measured by larger mili-
tary abilities, the change of strategic military importance as a
means to prevent conflict and promote peace and stability within
regions, and an overall increase in the motivational powers of
humanitarian causes and economic benfits.  In this way, the
research highlights important changes that began with the end of
the Cold War.
Further research on this project should validate that the
two measures the crosscheck between the normal OLS models
and the Panel-Corrected OLS models calls into question are truly
insignificant.  Creating ordinal, if not interval scales to measure
both internal strife and oil exportation would likely yield more
conclusive results than the dummy variables included in this
research due to time constraints.  Finally, a key goal of future
research should be empirically explaining more fully the defini-
tion of strategic importance that has begun to change as a motiva-
tor in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
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